One of the largest buyers of Russian consumer debt will remain under the control of Germany’s EOS Group — the foreign company has reversed its decision to sell its Russian subsidiary to Gazprombank, RBC has learned. The decision may have been influenced by deteriorating exit conditions for foreign businesses.
Germany’s EOS Group, which owns one of Russia’s largest debt collection agencies, has changed its mind about selling the company’s Russian unit to Gazprombank (GPB), according to two financial market sources who spoke to RBC. One source stated that the foreign shareholders of EOS Russia “pulled out of the deal,” and negotiations — ongoing since at least autumn 2024 — have now ceased. EOS Group began seeking a buyer for its Russian business in the spring of 2024.
“EOS Group is not engaged in any negotiations to sell its business in Russia,” an EOS representative told RBC. A request for comment was also sent to Gazprombank.
Headquartered in Hamburg, EOS Group specializes in collecting non-performing loans across more than 20 countries. It has operated in Russia since 2007. The Russian subsidiary is owned by German entities EOS Holding GmbH (1% stake) and EOS International Beteiligungs-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH (99%), according to the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRUL).
There are no public rankings of debt collection agencies in Russia, but experts surveyed by RBC consider EOS one of the leading players in the distressed debt (cession) market — the agency purchases bad debts from banks and collects on them independently. As of the end of 2024, EOS Russia’s total assets stood at 22.3 billion rubles, more than doubling over the past three years, according to RAS financial statements. By comparison, the assets of the largest cession company, First Client Bureau (PKB), totaled 23.1 billion rubles on the same date.
After the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine in February 2022, many foreign banks and companies announced plans to exit the Russian market. EOS Group did not issue any such statement, though EOS Russia reportedly halted purchases of new distressed debts, sources told RBC. The company continues to service existing portfolios.
“Before the start of the military operation, foreign companies held strong market positions in Russia, which they retain due to the revenue-generating portfolios built up over the years. However, without new debt acquisitions, company revenues begin to decline — and that’s precisely what is happening with EOS,” says Alexey Makhov, Vice President of investment firm Aspring Capital.
According to RAS reports, EOS’s revenue continued to grow in 2022–2023 but declined by 11.6% in 2024, to 9.6 billion rubles. Net profit also fell — by 7% to 4.8 billion rubles — although it remained above pre-2022 levels. Meanwhile, the Russian market for distressed debt cessions is booming: in 2024, debt portfolios sold to collection agencies reached a record 319.3 billion rubles, up 28.2% from 2023, according to the National Association of Professional Collection Agencies (NAPKA).
Without access to new debt and amid aggressive competition, EOS is “losing operational weight,” says Andrey Goncharenko, Deputy General Director of investment and consulting firm PSK-Solutions.
Why the Deal with Gazprombank Fell Through
Sources familiar with the negotiations between GPB structures and EOS Group previously told RBC that the purchase could have been a portfolio investment for Gazprombank — distressed assets of departing Western companies were being sold at deep discounts, presenting resale opportunities. At the time, Gazprombank was not under sanctions, a factor that may have been crucial for the seller, sources noted.
In October 2024, a government subcommission tightened rules for foreign divestment from Russia. The required discount to market value on asset sales was raised from 50% to 60%, and the mandatory contribution to the Russian budget increased from 15% to 35% of the asset’s value. These new rules applied to both new and pending deal applications.
In November 2024, Gazprombank was added to the U.S. Treasury’s list of blocked entities, restricting its access to U.S. dollar transactions. At the time, sources in the debt collection industry told RBC that this was unlikely to derail the EOS deal, as the bank remained unsanctioned by the European Union.
However, the deal never advanced in the government commission’s review process, a source told RBC. The German shareholders assessed the income generated by the Russian unit without new debt purchases and decided against selling the asset at a significant discount — particularly as hopes of diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine conflict began to resurface.
A sharp deterioration in exit terms for foreign businesses is likely the main reason the deal collapsed, says Vladimir Fomchenko, a partner at consulting firm Neo.
“It’s possible the deal failed due to existing regulatory procedures that made it impossible to reach a price acceptable to the seller. Regulators insist on steep discounts to market value and substantial contributions to the federal budget, which could drive the final sale price far below the company’s internal valuation,” agrees Goncharenko of PSK-Resheniya.
He also notes that EOS has accumulated a substantial amount of retained earnings — 16.2 billion rubles, according to its 2024 RAS financials — which cannot be repatriated as dividends due to Russian counter-sanctions.
“The owner may be betting on future capital unfreezing and a more favorable deal amid an improved geopolitical climate. Keeping the business in a ‘sleep mode’ is cheaper than selling now at a deep discount. It’s unlikely they have a definitive long-term strategy — this seems to be more of a tactical pause than a true exit. The asset remains operationally profitable and continues to offer dividend potential, giving the owner flexibility,” Goncharenko concludes.